Archive for the ‘ Identity ’ Category

Berger, P.L., Luckmann, T. The social construction of reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge. 1967

The Social Construction of Reality is rooted in a sociological interest in the concepts of Reality and Knowledge. Berger and Luckmann argue that from a sociological perspective this interest is justified by the social relativity of these concepts.  Berger and Luckman say,  “What is ‘real’ to a Tibetan monk may not be ‘real’ to an American Businessman.  The ‘knowledge’ of the criminal differs from the ‘knowledge’ of the criminologist.  It follows that specific agglomerations of ‘reality’ and ‘knowledge’ pertain to specific social contexts, and that these relationships will have to be included in an adequate sociological analysis of these contexts.” (p15)

Berger and Luckmann believe that the sociology of knowledge should be concerned with a society’s criteria of knowledge and how this is developed.  Their postpositivist stance is clearly laid out when they write of how members of society arrange their world view around their ‘here and now’, both originating and maintaining their ideas of reality and knowledge from their own thoughts and actions (and other significants in their life) rather than anything truly objective.

The world of everyday life is not only taken for granted as reality by the ordinary members of society in the subjectively meaningful conduct of their lives.  It is a world that originates in their thoughts and actions, and is maintained as real by these. (p 33)

Berger and Luckmann believe that semiotics or signification is the primary means by which human beings categorise their subjective view of the world.  They define a sign as anything that has an “explicit intention to serve as an index of subjective meaning.” (p50)   These include gestures, body language, material artefacts, and the most important is language, which they say may be defined as “a series of vocal signs”.

Language provides me with a ready-made possibility for the ongoing objectification of my unfolding experience. (p53)

Berger and Luckmann believe that society and social order are solely products of human activity, and that social norms and rules are a man-made, rather than natural, process.

Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality.  Man is a social product. (p79)

Because of this social construction, members of a society or ‘institution’ who were involved in the construction of the social norms are much more likely to conform to their constraints. Social disorder generally comes from new members of society that were not part of the construction. In order to properly ‘socialise’ new members of the society, sanctions must be put in place to prevent them from breaking the rules.

Deviance from the institutionally ‘programmed’ courses of action becomes likely once the institutions have become realities divorced from their original relevance in the concrete social process from which they arose.  To put this more simply, it is more likely that one will deviate from programmes set up for one by others than from programmes that one has helped establish oneself.  The new generation posits a problem of compliance, and its socialisation into the institutional order requires the establishment of sanctions. (p80)

Institutional segregation causes the formation of “socially segregated sub-universes of meaning”.  These sub-universes can be structured based on criteria such as sex, age, occupation or religion. Each sub-universe has it’s own structured values, norms, rules and barriers to entry.  Berger and Luckmann give the example of the medical profession as a sub-universe and the various mechanics in place to keep non-medical professions following the instructions of doctors and to keep doctors from resorting to unapproved conduct like religious or homeopathic healing.

The increasing number and complexity of sub-universes make them increasingly inaccessible to outsiders.  They become esoteric enclaves, ‘hermetically sealed’ (in the sense classically associated with the Hermetic corpus of secret lore) to all but those who have been properly initiated into their mysteries. […] The outsiders have to be kept out, sometimes even kept ignorant of the existence of the sub-universe. If, however, they are not so ignorant, and if the sub-universe requires various special privileges and recognitions from the larger society, there is the problem of keeping out the outsiders and at the same time having them acknowledge the legitimacy of this procedure. This is done through various techniques of intimidation, rational and irrational propaganda (appealing to the outsiders’ interests and to their emotions), mystification, and, generally, the manipulation of prestige symbols.  The insiders, on the other hand, have to be kept in. This requires the development of practical and theoretical procedures by which the temptation to escape from the sub-universe can be checked. (p104-105)

On the topic of revolution and revolutionary leaders Berger and Luckmann say that often a group will take on an ideological doctrine because it has gain for them and people of their status in society.  Involvement in such a group provides them with solidarity and legitimation for their cause.   The revolutionary leader likewise must have others who agree with him and help to maintain the subjective plausibility of his ideology in his own mind.  Practical success of the ideology fortifies the reality it possesses for the leader and the group as a whole.

 Frequently an ideology is taken on by a group because of specific theoretical elements that are conducive to its interests. For example, when an impoverished peasant group struggles against an urban merchant group that has financially enslaved it, it may rally around a religious doctrine that upholds the virtues of agrarian life, condemns the money economy and its credit system as immoral, and generally decries the luxuries of modern living. The ideological ‘gain’ of such a doctrine for the peasants is obvious. […] Every group engaged in social conflict requires solidarity.  Ideologies generate solidarity.  The choice of a particular ideology is not necessarily based on its intrinsic theoretical elements, but may stem from a chance encounter. (p141-142)

Judith S. Donath- Identity and Deception in the Virtual Community 1999, Communities in Cyberspace – Peter Kollock and Marc A. Smith eds, Routledge

 In the physical world there is an inherent unity to the self, for the body provides a compelling and convenient definition of identity.  The norm is: one body, one identity. (p29)

This chapter examines how identity is established and how identity deception is controlled online.  It takes an ethnographic approach, interpreting closely examined social discourse (Geertz 1973) and examining a virtual community as a communications system and its inhabitants as signallers and receivers.

Donath examines how identity is established in online communities – free from the anchor of their human body, participants online are free to create as many personae as they have time and energy to.  This chapter questions how these personae link back to the body-bound identity that created them and how much they are reliant on and responsible for each other.   Donath says that identity is an essential part of how we assess the trustworthiness or reliability of another and our reputations should be treated with care as they are essential to our placement within a community.  In online newsgroups trust is important because they often centre on information seeking and provision.   It is important to those seeking information that they know where the person providing the information is coming from in relation to their motivation and measure of expertise.  To the individual it is important that they are displaying a recognisable identity, as one of their main aims is to develop a reputation within the group.

There are many examples of deception in nature and the animal kingdom, as when certain animals mimic the colours or sounds of other more dangerous animals to scare away predators.  Donath asks the question why this is not a more common tactic, and though this question is not fully answered she notes that if deception is too prevalent a signal will become unreliable and will no longer convey its message.

[In] stable systems of deception […] the percentage of deceivers does not overwhelm the population, and the signal remains information-bearing, however imperfectly. And there are signals that are inherently reliable: signals that are difficult, or impossible, to cheat. (p32)

She discusses Amotz Zahavi’s 1993 work on signal reliability, which proposes the “handicap principle”. This principle suggests that signals such as carrying a heavy load signify strength or carelessly wasting lots of money signify wealth and these ‘assessment signals’ are not easily faked and thus generally very reliable.  Signals that don’t follow the handicap principle are called conventional signals.  These signals can be made without possessing the trait –such as wearing a t-shirt associated with a gym – but they mean something to both the signifier and the receiver due to custom or convention.  A conventional signal can become unstable if there is too much deception associated with it though, and it will eventually loose its significance.  Conventional signals are generally easier and less costly for both the signaller and the receiver so they are still widely used, despite the possibility of deception.   To make the signals more reliable there is often a punishment associated with deception within a community or society.

Identity in cyberspace is even more subjective and often harder to define. Signals usually take the forms of usernames, email addresses (and domain they are associated with), information included in the signature, and the voice and tone, all of which present the user in the way that they wish to be identified.

Goffman’s “The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life” makes the distinction of “expressions given” (signaller’s intent) and “expressions given off” (receiver’s interpretation) – which deals with the subtle nuances of language and action that can betray aspects of person’s true identity online. Donath asks if these are assessment or conventional signals.  The username, signature or email address of a net user can also often be used to trace their net history and get an impression of their interests and views and a complete internet history is something that requires more effort than most people are willing to fake.  The use of topic or forum specific language markers and acronyms can also identify a user as a member of a specific online group.

Most of this identifying information can be faked to some degree of success, and Internet trolls use this to their advantage, but others use this deception to protect their real life identity or to explore various personae. Pseudonyms are common and often expected, but they raise questions about balancing privacy and accountability.

New ways of establishing and of hiding identity are evolving in the virtual world. There is no formula that works best in all forums: balancing privacy and accountability, reliability and self-expression, security and accessibility requires a series of compromises and trade-offs whose value is very dependent on the goals of the group and of the individuals that comprise it. (p56)

Sherry Turkle – Looking Toward Cyberspace: Beyond Grounded Sociology, 1999, Contemporary Sociology

We come to see ourselves differently as we catch? sight of our images in the mirror of the machine. (p643)

In this essay Turkle concentrates on the creation of online personae.   She conducted an ethnography and clinical study of how people represent their virtual and ‘real’ selves via the Internet.

The Internet challenges all aspects of our identities as we are navigating virtual worlds, often in the company of others.  Turkle says that life on the screen is shifting the notion of identity to one that is multifaceted and flexible.   Because self-presentation online is written in text, users have the ability to choose how they wish to present themselves (everything from their physical characteristics, sex and sexuality and personality) to others online. The anonymity of the web gives users the chance to explore various aspects of their personality. Online MUDs, or Multi-user Domains, are specified online spaces where users create a persona or avatar and role-play with others.  Turkle says that though this is one of the most explicit examples of role-play and identity exploration online, it is by no means the only one.   Bulletin boards, newsgroups and chatrooms all allow for the creation of one or more personae, and modern computer environments allow for shifting from one online space to another in very little time.

As a user, you are attentive to just one of the windows on your screen at any given moment, but in a certain sense, you are a presence in all of them at all times[…]  The windows metaphor suggests a distributed self that exists in many worlds and plays many roles at the same time. P644

Turkle compares online life to Erik Erikson’s “psychosocial moratorium”, a relatively consequence-free adolescent time for intense experimentation and interaction with other people and new ideas. Erikson was writing in the 50s and 60s, and Turkle argues that in today’s society adolescence is no longer consequence-free- virtual communities generally are however, and this is part of what makes them so attractive. Turkle says that while many modern psychologists, social theorists, psychoanalysts and philosophers argue that the unitary self is an illusion, the requirements of everyday life mean that people need to accept responsibility for all of their actions.  Turkle calls cyberspace “an element of cultural bricolage” that we can use to think about identity, particularly this notion of decentred identity.

The instrumental computer, the computer that does things for us, has revealed another side: a subjective computer that does things to us as people, to our view of ourselves and our relationships, to our way of looking at out minds.  In simulation, identity can be fluid and multiple, a signifier no longer clearly points to the thing that is signified, and understanding is less likely to proceed through analysis than by navigation through virtual space. (p646)

Turkle says that the online personae we write can be used by us for self-reflection, as a sort of Rorchach test for us to examine who we are, and what we want and need from life.  In essence she is saying that we can use the personae we create online as a mirror for different aspects of ourselves that might otherwise remain hidden from our view.

David Buckingham (ed), Youth, Identity and Digital Media, 2008, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

 Identity also implies a relationship with a broader collective or social group of some kind.  When we talk about national identity, cultural identity, or gender identity, for example, we imply that our identity is partly a matter of what we share with other people. Here, identity is about identification with others whom we assume are similar to us (if not exactly the same), at least in some significant ways. (p1)

The chapters in this book deal largely with teenagers and their uses of technology in social, cultural and learning context.  Because of their specific emphasis on this demographic the chapters do not particularly reflect my area of research, however, the introductory chapter by David Buckingham provides a useful layout of a number of approaches to thinking about identity.   Buckingham allows that in many circumstances identity is used as a unique marker of a person – the elements that make us unique and remain consistent over time – however identity is also about how we relate to those around us.  Terms like cultural identity and  national identity, and the process of  ‘identification’ do not point towards an individual and unique characteristic, but rather a shared relationship and a sense of belonging. Buckingham lays out five key approaches, as he sees it, to thinking about identity.

According to the social theorist Zygmunt Bauman, the new prominence that is accorded to identity is a reflection of the fact that it is becoming ever more problematic. Globalization, the decline of the welfare state, increasing social mobility, greater flexibility in income, insecurity in personal relationships – all these developments are contributing to a sense of fragmentation and uncertainty, in which the traditional resources for identity formation are no longer so straightforward or so easily available. (p1)

The first approached laid out is that of psychology or development. Buckingham cites Erik Erikson’s book Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968) which draws from Piaget’s ‘ages and stages’ work, identifying adolescence as a period in which young people develop their independent social skills by joining new social groups or ‘cliques’, interacting with their peers, and break away from their family as their primary identity marker.  Erikson views adolescence as a “psychosocial moratorium” – a time when young people experiment with their identities and engage in risk. James Marcia’s work supports and builds on this idea of adolescence as identity crisis.

 A critical period of identity formation, in which individuals overcome uncertainty, become more self-aware of their strengths and weaknesses, and become more confident in their own unique qualities. In order to move on, adolecents must undergo a “crisis” in which they address key questions about their values and ideals, their future occupation and career, and their sexual identity. (p2)

The second approach is that of Sociology, dealing with socialisation of adolescents. This approach is largely concerned with social issues such as that of of youthful deviance and delinquency. Young people are frequently seen as problematic or ‘at risk’ and their anti-social behaviour is largely put down to social risk factors such as poverty or inequality.  Social historians argue that the idea of youth has changed over time and it varies between social groups and cultures – certainly the concept of a teenager is a relatively new one, and the term was only coined in the 1950s and initially used largely as a marketing tool. There is a substantial amount of work in the sociology field on youth subcultures, appropriation and resistance (subordinate and subversive) which initially focused almost entirely on young male subcultures, though more recently it has expanded into the areas of female and ethnic subcultures.

The third approach detailed by Buckingham is that of Social Identity.  This deals with how people define themselves and others as part of different groups. A sense of identity is defined both how they see themselves and whether others accept them as such.  Stereotyping or ‘cognitive simplification’ helps them to define their group in positive ways (and others in negative ways). Buckingham refers to Richard Jenkins who believes that social identity is a process of linking the self to the social.  Erving Goffman’s The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life (late 1950s) discusses the performative nature of social interaction, however Buckingham notes that his work is problematised because he draws a distinct separation of individual and social identity, which Goffman terms back-stage and front-stage behaviour.

The fourth approach is that of Identity Politics, which refers to activist social movements that seek equal status or recognition for minority social identities, such as ethnicity, gender or sexuality. Issues of representation are crucial in identity politics with who has the right to speak for said group being a contentious issue.  Identity Politics can lead to ‘essentialising’ one social identity trait in individuals and defining them by this alone.  This can be detrimental as it runs the risk of reinforcing binary oppositions.

The final approach identified by Buckingham is Identity in Social Theory. He deals with Anthony Giddens theory that because traditions such as religion are now much less influential that they were in the past we are now living in a ‘post-traditional’ society.  This means that we have many more life choices to make, guided by popular media and various experts. Modern people must be constantly self-reflexive because they are constantly working on creating their own biographical narrative. Buckingham says that Giddens gives little evidence that this is specific to the late-modern era, nor that it is a widespread phenomenon, though Michel Foucault’s writings also deal with at type of post-traditional society.  Where Giddens see this lack of traditions as liberating, Foucault sees it as a means of exercising disciplinary power.  He sees identity not as individual choice , but rather the influence of government. Power is diffused through social relationships and individuals are encouraged to regulate themselves. To Foucault, Giddens ‘self-reflexive’ process is that of self-monitoring and surveillance – a virtual Panopticon, if you will, that we have all be lured into without our knowledge. Buckingham feels that it’s important to look at work such as Giddens and Foucault because there have been many social changes in modern society  and it is important to note that they are not all generated by technological advances.

The second part of the chapter deals with two key theories when writing about the uptake of technology.  The first is technological determinism – the attribution of enormous power to technology.  Carolyn Marvin (1988) has wrote about the binary views that are often held of technology throughout the last number of centuries.  New technology like the telephone was perceived either as a threat to social relationships and hierarchies or a virtual panacea that would have great power to improve life.

These discussions are mirrored by modern day discussions on technology- eg, the internet – which are often either celebrated or greeted with extreme paranoia. Technological determinism in its most basic form is the notion that technology is an autonomous force that emerges and forces itself upon a social system, its impact on the society in no way determined by the circumstances or application of its use .  In binary opposition is the Social Shaping of Technology – the idea that technology is a value-free entity that can be manipulated by social need and be whatever people choose to make of it. The truth generally lies somewhere in the middle ground; that technology use is determined both by those with a vested interest in its success (producers) and by the perceived need that the consumers have for it.  In the end viewing technology as either the cause or fix of social change is problematic.

Television is a passive medium, while the net is active; television “dumbs down” its users, while the net raises their intelligence; television broadcasts a single view of the world, while the net is democratic and interactive; television isolates, while the net builds communities; and so on. (p13)

Buckingham next touches on Prensky’s popular distinctions of ‘digital natives’ and ‘digital immigrants’ and Tapscott’s ‘Net Generation’.  These schools of thought deal with young people born into an era when they have grown up using the internet.  They indicate a new way of learning for young people that is not dominated by authoritarian teachers and allows young people to explore information at their own pace.  These arguments again ignore many variables, such as that many digital natives use tv more than internet while many of their parents may spend more time online, the down sides of technologies undemocratic online communities, and the limitations of digital learning, and the issue of the digital divide between tech rich and tech poor.

Steve Jones, review of selected works

Copies of all of these articles can be found here.

I am reading Jones from the perspective of what his writing can offer in terms of both the historical and more recent developments in information technology (specifically the Internet) and how community and communication online diverges and converges worth traditional forms of communication.

Jones’ early work deals mainly with the impact of technology on space and time. Jones makes the point that as digitisation becomes more prevalent, space becomes more transparently and technologically a social construction.  He looks to anthropology for discourse on space, location and identity and his understanding of the social construction of space is influenced by the work of McLuhan, Innis and James Carey. In a number of his early works he deals with how audio (specifically recorded music) and space relate. He investigates the idea of re-creating a sense of 3D space in the home when listening to digital audio recording, (Sound, Space, and Digitisation, 1993) although he notes that in music consumption, like film, fidelity and realism are not problematic as it is clear that the sound is recorded, rather than live.

In Video Literacy (1989), Jones once again deals with the dichotomy of realism and fidelity in digital media, this time in video.  He draws a parallel between written word and video, saying that while text is often difficult to refute, because its ‘context-free’ language prevents it from being easily contested, video is even harder to refute.  He makes the point that there is often no place for argument or right to reply when video evidence is given, and to the American public “seeing is believing”.  Drawing on Ernst Cassirer’s theories of symbolic communication (An Essay on Man, 1962; The philosophy of Symbolic Forms Vol 1-3, 1923,1925,1929) Jones says “Human beings create and locate themselves in cultural patterns that are created by use of symbols, interpret and transcend those patterns, and communicate with each other using naturally evoked images that acquire meaning through use and shared experience.” (p94) In essence he is arguing that human narrative is the systematic structuring and restructuring of cultural patterns.  Because culture affects perception of space and time a change in culture can also effect human perception of space and time. Jones also touches on the notion that as oppositional, avant-garde practices are brought into mainstream TV, rebellious movements such as Rock and Roll lose their oppositional status.

In Unlicensed Broadcasting: Content and Conformity (1994) Jones discusses the results of a study of the reasons why pirate broadcasters believe that their stations were shut down by the FCC.  Jones starts out by saying that recent scholarship “Claims that most unlicensed broadcasters believe the FCC shuts down their operation because program content is offensive, obscene, unpatriotic or tasteless” (p395) but Jones’ content analysis indicates that unlicensed content is generally much the same as licensed content. He posits that shutting down pirate operations is rather the Police’s way of retaining control over what Yoder describes as “clandestine” operations which are radically and politically motivated and support violent change. (A. Yoder, Pirate Radio Stations, Blue Ridge Summit, PA:Tab Books, 1990)  Jones makes two generalisations, based on his results.  The first is that the content of pirate stations is very similar to licensed stations with broadcasters mostly relying on Rock.   From this he speculates that pirate stations do not so much provide an alternative to commercial stations, but rather they are a means of ‘joining in’ for disenfranchised youths.  The second finding is that generally the unlicensed broadcasts are outside of standard AM and commercial FM frequencies and this implies a desire to avoid complains from licensed broadcasters and to stay off the mainstream radar.  Jones concludes that the connection between unlicensed broadcasting, youth and rebellion may simply be that pirate stations are the youth’s way of joining in on their own terms and creating their own space.

In Hyperpunk: Cyberpunk and Information Technology (1994) Jones examines the Cyberpunk ideology, typified by contemporary science fiction novels as near-future constructs in which information fuels both global economy and individual existence.  Jones says “The consumption of information via the mass media is an ideological practice within the realm of symbolic activity.” There is no such thing as Nationalism in Cyberpunk as it is seen as a barrier flow.  Rather than governments, the economic structure is dominated by Zaibatsu – the multinational corporation. The core of the Cyberpunk ideology is that all information should be free to everyone.  This is largely due to their perception that information is power and an uneven distribution of power allows the Zaibatsu to exert control over the masses.  Tesla first set out the cyberpunk ‘ethos’ in 1904 when he wrote of his desire to transmit information for free to everyone.  It is also important that the information be separate form it’s context and that the audience be allowed to make their own sense of it (hypertext). The heroes of cyberpunk books are the people who can master cyberspace, a virtual space of information through which the mind “has immediate access to a global information network” (p83) and Jones concludes that this is what those who subscribe to the Cyberpunk ethos aspire to.

In The Consequences of Interaction in Electronic Communities (1997) Jones notes that throughout history every advance in technology/development, from nuclear power to the written word, has had a positive and negative side. He posits that once we get used to the technology, we learn to accept it for its positive side and we feel that we have gained some measure of control of its negative side. Any new communications medium is deemed to cause revolution when it is initially introduced and there will always be a proportion of the population that will oppose this.

Jones is influenced by Schuler’s work in New Community Networks (1996) when he says that communications communities are groups of people with common goals. He once again comes back to the concepts of space and time and how the Internet can break these down.  He also quotes McLaughlin et al. (Standards of Conduct for Usenet, 1985, p105) when he says that Internet users feel that the Internet’s content ‘belongs to them’.  There is a touch of the long-running Technological Determinism vs Social Shaping of Information Technology­­­­­ debate in the article, as when Jones says, “We are, simply, more likely to restart the computer than to think of alternatives to it, or how it shapes and defines the activities we believe we solely define, or how we (and not it’s designers) think it should work.” (p31) The eventual conclusion he reaches however is that it is not the technologies that make the quality of socialisation, but rather the way in which we choose to use and view them.

In Understanding Community in the Information Age (1999) Jones once again focuses on the spatial and temporal issues that Internet technology brings.  He says that in online communities space is illusory and time is problematised by the “instantaneity” of Computer Mediated Communications.  The whole notion of ‘space’ online is built around the presence of knowledge and information and the beliefs and practices of communities and societies “abstracted from physical space”.  It is the “Ritual sharing” (Carey, 1987) of this information that binds an online community.

Likewise in Rheingold and the Illusion of Community (2000) Jones talks about the ability the Internet gives us to “surmount time and space and ‘be’ anywhere”.  Jones adds “The manner in which we seek to find community, empowerment, and political action all embedded in our ability to use [Computer Mediated Communication], is thereby troubling. No one medium, no one technology, has been able to provide those elements in combination, and often we have been unable to find them in any medium. CMC has potential for a variety of consequence, some anticipated, some not.” (p227)

In The Bias of the Web (2000) Jones discusses the parallels and differences between the history of Journalism and the Internet.  Beyond that they are both vessels for content and information, they share the trait of being potential public forums which create and host imagined communities.  Jones equates the Internet in some ways to old penny papers because it gives the public what they are looking for.  Having said that, Journalism on the web differs from traditional journalism as the focus and context has shifted to centre on the user rather than the journalist/medium. The history that Internet journalism catalogues is largely driven by the public interest.  Jones says “on the web, referral is built in via the hyperlink. As a result, news on the web has less to do with creating a local record of life [...] and more to do with anticipating what’s next by accumulating information and making connections among stories, hearsay, gossip, disparate pieces of information that are sometimes coupled in the readers imagination, and other times linked via hypertext markup language or HTML.” (p178)

In Internet Use and the Terror Attacks (2002) with Lee Rainie, Jones examines the ways that Americans used the Internet for communications and to gather information in the days following the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon.  Although people relied more heavily on the telephone and television at this time, 50% of Internet users went online looking for news about the attacks and 72% of users used email in some way related to the event, to display patriotism, contact family, discuss the events, etc.  Jones and Rainie suggest that this engagement with the internet at this time may have influenced many of these users to continue to use the internet to engage with news topics etc in a way that they previously had not.

In Political Activism in the Digital Age: The Use of the Internet for Political Engagement Among Meetup Attendees (2008) Jones and Francisco Seoane Pérez  examine the use of the Internet in Howard Dean’s 2004 campaign for the Democratic Presidential candidate position.  The campaign had a huge online backing and most of the people who involved themselves initially online had not been involved in politics before.  They had found out about the campaign through the internet rather than through their own personal connections and the article examines whether the internet better facilitates the involvement of those who were previously not politically active.

In this instance Jones and Pérez equate the Internet to a Greek Chorus, with a cast telling people how they should invest their time and which candidates they should be putting money behind.  The Greek Chorus not only helps the audience to follow the play, but also represents the reactions of an ideal public and this type of role, played out by supporters online, helps to engage the unengaged.

They asks the question “Once the system is radicalised, enraged, alarmed by a threat, where does he/she go to find a solution, or a way of contributing to respond to that menace?” (p4)  This is where the Internet comes in, fulfilling the need to communicate and learn about, and ultimately take action in relation to perceived changes or threats as they occur.