Archive for the ‘ Language and Rhetoric ’ Category

Berger, P.L., Luckmann, T. The social construction of reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge. 1967

The Social Construction of Reality is rooted in a sociological interest in the concepts of Reality and Knowledge. Berger and Luckmann argue that from a sociological perspective this interest is justified by the social relativity of these concepts.  Berger and Luckman say,  “What is ‘real’ to a Tibetan monk may not be ‘real’ to an American Businessman.  The ‘knowledge’ of the criminal differs from the ‘knowledge’ of the criminologist.  It follows that specific agglomerations of ‘reality’ and ‘knowledge’ pertain to specific social contexts, and that these relationships will have to be included in an adequate sociological analysis of these contexts.” (p15)

Berger and Luckmann believe that the sociology of knowledge should be concerned with a society’s criteria of knowledge and how this is developed.  Their postpositivist stance is clearly laid out when they write of how members of society arrange their world view around their ‘here and now’, both originating and maintaining their ideas of reality and knowledge from their own thoughts and actions (and other significants in their life) rather than anything truly objective.

The world of everyday life is not only taken for granted as reality by the ordinary members of society in the subjectively meaningful conduct of their lives.  It is a world that originates in their thoughts and actions, and is maintained as real by these. (p 33)

Berger and Luckmann believe that semiotics or signification is the primary means by which human beings categorise their subjective view of the world.  They define a sign as anything that has an “explicit intention to serve as an index of subjective meaning.” (p50)   These include gestures, body language, material artefacts, and the most important is language, which they say may be defined as “a series of vocal signs”.

Language provides me with a ready-made possibility for the ongoing objectification of my unfolding experience. (p53)

Berger and Luckmann believe that society and social order are solely products of human activity, and that social norms and rules are a man-made, rather than natural, process.

Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality.  Man is a social product. (p79)

Because of this social construction, members of a society or ‘institution’ who were involved in the construction of the social norms are much more likely to conform to their constraints. Social disorder generally comes from new members of society that were not part of the construction. In order to properly ‘socialise’ new members of the society, sanctions must be put in place to prevent them from breaking the rules.

Deviance from the institutionally ‘programmed’ courses of action becomes likely once the institutions have become realities divorced from their original relevance in the concrete social process from which they arose.  To put this more simply, it is more likely that one will deviate from programmes set up for one by others than from programmes that one has helped establish oneself.  The new generation posits a problem of compliance, and its socialisation into the institutional order requires the establishment of sanctions. (p80)

Institutional segregation causes the formation of “socially segregated sub-universes of meaning”.  These sub-universes can be structured based on criteria such as sex, age, occupation or religion. Each sub-universe has it’s own structured values, norms, rules and barriers to entry.  Berger and Luckmann give the example of the medical profession as a sub-universe and the various mechanics in place to keep non-medical professions following the instructions of doctors and to keep doctors from resorting to unapproved conduct like religious or homeopathic healing.

The increasing number and complexity of sub-universes make them increasingly inaccessible to outsiders.  They become esoteric enclaves, ‘hermetically sealed’ (in the sense classically associated with the Hermetic corpus of secret lore) to all but those who have been properly initiated into their mysteries. […] The outsiders have to be kept out, sometimes even kept ignorant of the existence of the sub-universe. If, however, they are not so ignorant, and if the sub-universe requires various special privileges and recognitions from the larger society, there is the problem of keeping out the outsiders and at the same time having them acknowledge the legitimacy of this procedure. This is done through various techniques of intimidation, rational and irrational propaganda (appealing to the outsiders’ interests and to their emotions), mystification, and, generally, the manipulation of prestige symbols.  The insiders, on the other hand, have to be kept in. This requires the development of practical and theoretical procedures by which the temptation to escape from the sub-universe can be checked. (p104-105)

On the topic of revolution and revolutionary leaders Berger and Luckmann say that often a group will take on an ideological doctrine because it has gain for them and people of their status in society.  Involvement in such a group provides them with solidarity and legitimation for their cause.   The revolutionary leader likewise must have others who agree with him and help to maintain the subjective plausibility of his ideology in his own mind.  Practical success of the ideology fortifies the reality it possesses for the leader and the group as a whole.

 Frequently an ideology is taken on by a group because of specific theoretical elements that are conducive to its interests. For example, when an impoverished peasant group struggles against an urban merchant group that has financially enslaved it, it may rally around a religious doctrine that upholds the virtues of agrarian life, condemns the money economy and its credit system as immoral, and generally decries the luxuries of modern living. The ideological ‘gain’ of such a doctrine for the peasants is obvious. […] Every group engaged in social conflict requires solidarity.  Ideologies generate solidarity.  The choice of a particular ideology is not necessarily based on its intrinsic theoretical elements, but may stem from a chance encounter. (p141-142)

Judith S. Donath- Identity and Deception in the Virtual Community 1999, Communities in Cyberspace – Peter Kollock and Marc A. Smith eds, Routledge

 In the physical world there is an inherent unity to the self, for the body provides a compelling and convenient definition of identity.  The norm is: one body, one identity. (p29)

This chapter examines how identity is established and how identity deception is controlled online.  It takes an ethnographic approach, interpreting closely examined social discourse (Geertz 1973) and examining a virtual community as a communications system and its inhabitants as signallers and receivers.

Donath examines how identity is established in online communities – free from the anchor of their human body, participants online are free to create as many personae as they have time and energy to.  This chapter questions how these personae link back to the body-bound identity that created them and how much they are reliant on and responsible for each other.   Donath says that identity is an essential part of how we assess the trustworthiness or reliability of another and our reputations should be treated with care as they are essential to our placement within a community.  In online newsgroups trust is important because they often centre on information seeking and provision.   It is important to those seeking information that they know where the person providing the information is coming from in relation to their motivation and measure of expertise.  To the individual it is important that they are displaying a recognisable identity, as one of their main aims is to develop a reputation within the group.

There are many examples of deception in nature and the animal kingdom, as when certain animals mimic the colours or sounds of other more dangerous animals to scare away predators.  Donath asks the question why this is not a more common tactic, and though this question is not fully answered she notes that if deception is too prevalent a signal will become unreliable and will no longer convey its message.

[In] stable systems of deception […] the percentage of deceivers does not overwhelm the population, and the signal remains information-bearing, however imperfectly. And there are signals that are inherently reliable: signals that are difficult, or impossible, to cheat. (p32)

She discusses Amotz Zahavi’s 1993 work on signal reliability, which proposes the “handicap principle”. This principle suggests that signals such as carrying a heavy load signify strength or carelessly wasting lots of money signify wealth and these ‘assessment signals’ are not easily faked and thus generally very reliable.  Signals that don’t follow the handicap principle are called conventional signals.  These signals can be made without possessing the trait –such as wearing a t-shirt associated with a gym – but they mean something to both the signifier and the receiver due to custom or convention.  A conventional signal can become unstable if there is too much deception associated with it though, and it will eventually loose its significance.  Conventional signals are generally easier and less costly for both the signaller and the receiver so they are still widely used, despite the possibility of deception.   To make the signals more reliable there is often a punishment associated with deception within a community or society.

Identity in cyberspace is even more subjective and often harder to define. Signals usually take the forms of usernames, email addresses (and domain they are associated with), information included in the signature, and the voice and tone, all of which present the user in the way that they wish to be identified.

Goffman’s “The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life” makes the distinction of “expressions given” (signaller’s intent) and “expressions given off” (receiver’s interpretation) – which deals with the subtle nuances of language and action that can betray aspects of person’s true identity online. Donath asks if these are assessment or conventional signals.  The username, signature or email address of a net user can also often be used to trace their net history and get an impression of their interests and views and a complete internet history is something that requires more effort than most people are willing to fake.  The use of topic or forum specific language markers and acronyms can also identify a user as a member of a specific online group.

Most of this identifying information can be faked to some degree of success, and Internet trolls use this to their advantage, but others use this deception to protect their real life identity or to explore various personae. Pseudonyms are common and often expected, but they raise questions about balancing privacy and accountability.

New ways of establishing and of hiding identity are evolving in the virtual world. There is no formula that works best in all forums: balancing privacy and accountability, reliability and self-expression, security and accessibility requires a series of compromises and trade-offs whose value is very dependent on the goals of the group and of the individuals that comprise it. (p56)

Nancy K Baym, Interpreting Soap Operas and Creating Community,1993, Indiana University press

While acknowledging that the two most commonly argued impacts that technology has on folklore are that it could either displace or destroy folkore practice, or provide new topics and help to disseminate folklore, in Interpreting Soap Operas and Creating Community: Inside a Computer–mediated Fan Culture (1993) Nancy Baym posits a third possible impact:  that computer networks can create entirely new community with its own distinct folklore traditions. She challenges the traditional concept of a folk group, which is one that shares a location and has face-to-face interaction, positioning R.a.t.s. -an USENET group about American daytime television- as a folk group that spans time zones and international boundaries.

Computer-mediated groups share the topics around which they organize, the system that links them, and the communication that passes between them. These three sets of resources are enough to create distinct ways of speaking, and hence distinctive folk groups and folkloric traditions. P144

In a way the group will develop their own shared social markers in the way that they talk and behave, creating their own etiquette and expectations for behaviour within the group.  Because R.a.t.s. was established in 1984 it is one of the oldest USENET groups it displays a highly developed culture. Even though it has a large number of participants, a small group of people do most of the performing, generating most of the conversation and receiving the highest name recognition.  This is a description I recognise as attributed to the B.N.F.s (Big Name Fans) of more modern day online fandoms.  The group has an initially system  so that people can easily identify what a thread is going to be about.  Again, it is common in modern day fandoms to label fan fiction and art with short hand descriptions, listing the genre, pairing (if any) and intended audience.  The methods of conveying emotion and traditional physical social cues like nods and winks that Baym discusses also remain evident in modern fandoms and online communities.

Baym believes that these traits indicate the creation of new folk groups within computer mediated communication.  She says:  “R.a.t.s. demonstrates that these networks can serve as the site for complex, interwoven, and personalized communities. These communities exist in asynchronous time and without shared location. As a result they rely more than ever on the traditionalization of communicative practice.” P174